Abstract
Introduction
The theoretical importance of the concept of hybrid war has been increasing within the modern political and legal discourse. The term is usually used to refer to a specific phenomenon that has become common in the world over the past decades. This phenomenon covers a complexity of classical methods of warfare, the exercise of military aggression (involving regular and irregular military formations), and new technologies, especially those related to the powerful information influence of the enemy and its allies. It seems that the global scientific community should concentrate its efforts on finding successful ways to counter hybrid war by using the positive and negative experiences of those countries that have faced a similar phenomenon before. Ukraine is one of them: it has experienced all modern forms and methods of fighting a hybrid war with the Russian Federation.
As is known, the active (open) phase of the war began in March 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, then continued with the seizure of parts of the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. It is still going on.
The Ukrainian experience of combatting some of the modern manifestations of hybrid warfare might be interesting in different ways, but among those that are key is the emergence and development of new types of socially dangerous behaviour, and the acquisition of atypical features through such crimes. These include criminality in the area of journalism, which requires independent scientific review, thus allowing us to thoroughly analyse the status of a journalist within the focus of criminal law theory and practice.
In Ukraine, the status of a journalist is determined by Art. 1 of the Law of Thus, a journalist is someone who regularly works with information for the media, and whose main function is to work on collecting, processing and creating information for the media. The criminal law aspects of such activity are emphasized in this article.
In view of all the above, the purpose of this article is to study the phenomenon of crimes committed by journalists in the course of their professional activities, as well as crimes committed against journalists (when the journalist becomes a crime victim). One of the manifestations of this phenomenon is found in Ukraine, which remains in the hybrid war environment to this day.
The structure of the article allows primary consideration of the specifics in modern manifestations of hybrid war with an emphasis on its information component. Furthermore, the place of journalistic crime among other types of crime is demonstrated and its ability to be enforced under the influence of modern hybrid war factors is underlined. The following section refers to the criminal law limitations on the freedom of speech, followed by those issues surrounding a journalist as a potential crime perpetrator associated with the dissemination of knowingly false information. The last section accumulates key aspects of the discussed issues, forms conclusions and outlines potential directions for further research.
Hybrid war and its information component
Recently, issues arising from hybrid war have been penetrating deeper into the scientific matter of political and legal studies. Study of its components, new types and means of warfare, and analysis of the gained experience in combating contemporary manifestations of hybrid warfare naturally form the agenda for many scientists in law and politics.
Understanding this phenomenon remains ambiguous in modern international law; however, experts agree that hybrid war is the newest Political scientists also refer to the significance of the information component of hybrid war. They argue that the specifics of the armed conflict-the place and role of the military argument in politics-are largely determined by the degree of societal development and technological advancement. Simultaneously, the informative society creates essential forms of resistance, and such resistance does not necessarily have to be armed or open (Mahda 2014) .
Hybrid war usually involves a combination of classic warfare and the use of irregular armed groups. According to the former security adviser to the UN and NATO General Frank van Kappen, "the state, which leads hybrid war, making a deal with non-state performers by the militants, local groups, organizations, the relationship is formally denied. These performers can do things that the state itself cannot do, because any state is obliged to follow the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention on the laws of war on land, the agreements with other countries. All the dirty work can be shifted on shoulders of non-state groups" (CSAF 2014).
A bright example of such a hybrid course of war, in which a more militarily powerful aggressor state negotiates with non-government performers -groups of local people and militants with whom it denies any formal affiliation -is the Russian activity in Ukraine from 2014 to the present. At the beginning of the conflict, certain groups of Russian soldiers organized and coordinated armed volunteer detachments with the local population members in Eastern Ukraine, thus avoiding, to a certain point, direct entry of its troops over the Ukrainian border. Such a move allowed Russia to partially bypass international law related to warfare principles. Yevhen Mahda points out that hybrid warfare in Ukraine has not only revealed weak parts of the Ukrainian army and society, but has also articulated a new challenge to the world in general and to Eastern European countries in particular. The absence of open confrontation, the use of new tactics, misinformation, creating an atmosphere of panic and threats for a short period of time, and the use of human shields have all demonstrated the army's helplessness in this new type of war (Mahda 2014) .
New information tactics in Ukraine related to the aggressive use of the media to manipulate public opinion have become particularly threatening. There is no doubt that appropriate conditions for further military confrontation and for masking external manifestations of aggression have been created with their help. According to Horbulin, there was not just enemy propaganda taking place in the Ukrainian scenario, but also a "war of meanings/senses" (the beginning of which could be related to the period of [2006] [2007] . The whole multiplicity of information channels has been involved to retransmit these senses. The main structural elements in such war are simulacra-images of something that does not exist in reality. The strategic goal of exploiting simulacra is to replace objective perceptions of target groups about the nature of conflict with the "information phantoms" that the aggressor needs (Horbulin 2014: 9) .
For the time being, despite the fact that the Russian leadership has officially denied any involvement in the crimes committed in Ukraine, the intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukrainian politics, as well as its aggressive actions on Ukrainian territory, have received adequate legal assessment both at the highest levels of Ukrainian government as well as in the arenas of foreign and international policy. Positioning Russian armed forces in the territory of Ukraine in violation of national and international legal acts has been correctly recognized as partial occupation of the sovereign Ukrainian territory (UP 2014; UP 2015; PA 2015; UN 2014) .
Russia uses many techniques in its hybrid war against Ukraine, but the major one is its information war (NR 2014) . The roots of Russia's hybrid methods go back to the Soviet era, although the label is more recent. "Active measures", as hybrid warfare was called back then-such as spreading disinformation-was an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. Today, some of Russia's tactics are surprisingly similar, but the current information environment makes their use both more efficient and complex (NR 2017). The aggressor carried out the same activities in the separate districts of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, due to the difficulties of implementing the Crimean scenario in Donbass, the occupational forces resorted to stricter and more violent counterattacks in the pro-Ukrainian information sphere.
Kidnappings and arrests of journalists, activists, streamers and bloggers took place in order to prevent the circulation of an alternative media picture from the occupied territories. In addition, like in Crimea, there were numerous examples of changing sides by employees of TV and radio companies that were seized by Russians. Later on, the same employees started working for the new media created by the Russian terrorist forces. Starting in summer 2014, the "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic" (with the participation of Russian advisors) began converting the media space of the territories into an "information ghetto" where there was no chance of seeing or hearing an alternative perspective or receiving true coverage of events (Horbulin 2017a: 42) .
As the researchers rightly point out, the use of misinformation could be the most effective means of hybrid warfare: "misinformation and propaganda are being used to complement the overall Russian-integrated approach to hybrid warfare. Russia uses the media, for example, Russia Today, Sputnik News, and members of the public sympathetic to Russia who write to newspapers, to spread misinformation in a highly persuasive and credible way. In the present conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has effectively used the information sphere as an integral tool in its hybrid war against the people of Ukraine" (Bachmann and Paphiti 2016: 37) ; "past experience in Ukraine and theory evaluation indicate that the new-generation war includes multi-level efforts aimed at destabilizing the state functions and changing the internal order. The information space will provide a range of opportunities to reduce the opponent's potential, especially through the use of new technologies and information networking. A non-standard approach to the fight will be crucial in the new-generation wars" (Banasik 2016: 177) . 
Journalism-related crimes as the new form of criminality
The information-related component of a hybrid war, as demonstrated above, is implemented under a wide range of vectors, the media being one of them. Mass media and social networks are used extensively for the realization of political goals of the aggression which are usually achieved by regular war. Taking into account the necessity of preventing such hybrid war manifestations and effectively resisting them, there is a strong demand for the scientific exploration of journalistic work in the context of legal regulation.
The key concept of criminal law and criminology is the category of criminality. Today there is no doubt that criminality is a phenomenon attributable to any society. In its general form, it can be described as the commission of acts by a fraction of general public members that cause significant harm to a person, society, state or Commonwealth, thus constituting the most egregious type of human behaviour.
Legal features of criminality should be recognized as its important feature, and therefore crimes include only acts which are directly mentioned in criminal law and which can trigger penalties under this law. The theory of criminal law provides that, based on this feature, crimes are distinguished from other dangerous offences, particularly those that can potentially cause significant damage but are not identified as such in criminal law.
Criminalization or decriminalization in law is the only legal means of changing the list of acts that are recognized as criminal.
As put by Yakov Gilinskiy, "criminality is a complex social phenomenon without 'natural' boundaries (as distinct from drug-addiction, drunkenness and suicide) and definable with the help of two multi-faceted criteria: 1) its danger or real harmfulness to society and 2) its designation in the penal code (nullum crimen sine lege) -there is no crime without its designation in the penal code" (Gilinskiy 2001: 74) .
Criminality is extremely sensitive about social and political change and clearly reflects this. Changes in social relations under the influence of various factors (including the information component of hybrid war -the information war) can transform perceptions of criminality by affecting the emergence of new types of crime. As noted by Natalia Savinova, media space that is not regulated by law under conditions of an information society leads to a state of anomie in the latter: this is embodied in the change of social ideals and morals. When certain social groups no longer feel their involvement in the society, which brings about their exclusion, new social norms and values are denied by members of these groups, including declared patterns of behaviour; at the same time, their own (particularly an illegal pattern of) behaviour is put forward as a means to achieve social and individual goals (Savinova 2013: 209) .
Professional, economic, environmental, organized, corrupt, recidivist, unintentional and other types of criminality are traditionally distinguished. Such classification helps, first of all, to specify the study of many issues; secondly, it is important for meeting practical goals in combating crime in general and its individual variations in particular (Danshyn 2009 ).
Nowadays, taking into account the intensification of informational technologies development as inherent in a globalized society, there are even more reasons to believe in the emergence of a new type of criminality -that is, journalism-related criminality. These acknowledge not only that journalists may become victims of these crimes, but so too may their close relatives and family members.
Pavlykivskyi notes that, unlike in post-Soviet countries, the legislation of European countries and the United States does not contain criminal law prohibition of violations of journalists' rights, which is, in his opinion, to some extent conditioned by the effectiveness of the regulatory norms in the area of ensuring freedom of speech and the activities of journalists in these countries. At the same time, the introduction of norms of criminal liability for interference with journalistic activities in Ukraine is broadly in line with the generally accepted principles of criminal law and principles of the criminalization of socially dangerous acts (Pavlykivskyi 2017: 6, 26 ). Secondly, journalism-related criminality refers to journalists who, under appropriate circumstances, may be recognized as crime perpetrators in the area of their professional activities. This component of journalistic criminality is of higher interest, since it is much less studied and organized while relevant data on it remain mostly unstructured. In addition, the issue of crimes against journalists -i.e. those associated with the violation of their rights -is primarily the focus of the global legal discourse. As for the improper performance of professional functions by journalists, their abuse and unlawful acts of behaviour in the area of information relations, so far there is no adequate understanding of this complex criminal law phenomenon.
When describing journalists as potential crime perpetrators, one should take into account that journalistic activity consists of two types of action: that related to obtaining information (as well as its separate or related symptoms in the form of collection and creation) and that related to the usage of information (including its distribution and storage). There is no doubt that a journalist has the right to receive and use information in any way, except those prohibited by law and/or which violate the ethical principles of journalism. Some of these methods of unlawful procurement (use) of information by a journalist through their embodied high level of public danger can quite naturally create grounds for legal liability.
Therefore, it would make sense to divide all crimes that might be committed by a journalist in the course of his or her professional activities into the following two groups: 1) crimes committed when collecting, receiving and creating information; and 2) crimes committed when storing, distributing or otherwise using information.
The content of each of these groups will be further disclosed schematically.
Based on the acts that are criminalized in Ukraine, subgroups of crimes that cover various forms of journalist violation of the legally regulated framework for collecting, receiving, creating, distributing, storing and otherwise using information will be pointed out. 
Encroachment on the right to confidentiality: illegal gathering
of information that constitutes commercial or banking secrecy with the purpose of using it. In Ukraine, the most well-known examples are the case against Gerus A promising direction for current scientific studies is related to the expediency of criminalization of certain acts committed by a journalist as a special actor of crime, particularly that related to the dissemination of deliberately false information. As correctly mentioned in the legal literature, "the newest challenge for those in crime control and prevention is to keep up with new innovations in crime and their impact.
Encroachment on the order of access to information
As well, policy makers must attempt to anticipate the risks and pitfalls that result from rapid change. This will require future research activities encompassing the effects of globalization, demography and its trends, technology, economics and social and organizational structures amongst others. Investment in all such research activities can yield significant benefits for the reduction of crime and the development of crime control in the future. We all have a role to play in preventing crime. If anything can be learned from the past, it is that appropriate expenditure on crime prevention planning can be more cost effective than seeking to solve the problem after it has become entrenched" (Graycar 2001 ).
Criminal law limits on the freedom of speech The relevant constitutional provision establishes the common civilizational rule that is completely consistent with the principles produced by international practice and clearly enshrined in many international legal documents.
At the same time, just like any other rule, it has a number of exceptions.
We are talking here about the legally provided limitations on the exercise of freedom of speech. Indeed, exercise of the rights mentioned in Article of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorders or crimes, for the protection of public health, protection of reputation or rights of other people, for preventing disclosure of information The aforementioned provision (to the principles of information relations), while having a general character is, however, of an imperative nature and imposes a duty on the journalist to use only true information in the course of his professional activity and not to abuse the rights given to him by the law. It is not accidental that breach of such principles by a journalist can form the basis for bringing him to legal (disciplinary, civil, administrative or criminal) liability.
Regarding the latter, the issue here is with the journalist committing the above mentioned offences related to unlawful means of receiving, using and disseminating information of certain content. In case of spreading false information -that is, fictional information (on events, things or facts Journalists as potential perpetrators of crimes related to dissemination of deliberately false information: issue outline
As previously established, the legitimacy of receipt, use, distribution, storage and protection is correctly recognized as one of the principles of information relations. Legal protection covers only such journalistic activity as is undertaken in accordance with statutory established requirements.
However, illegal professional activities of journalists are not acceptable and, depending on the type of violation, require a proper response from both the socio-moral and legal aspects (i.e. within the implementation of all kinds of legal liability).
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At the same time, legal professionals are increasingly often addressing the fact that the current group of crimes that can be committed by a journalist in the course of his or her professional activity is not able to ensure the completeness of criminal law provisions in this area. After all, some acts of journalism conduct remain not punishable despite the inherent nature of their social danger. This is particularly the case with spreading deliberately false information by the mass media aimed at discrediting a natural person or entity in order to obtain illegal benefits (Busol 2015: 26) , manipulating the consciousness of the population through media and information expansion (Savinova 2014: 111) and others. Some lawyers go even further, by offering to believe that there is a crime of "blatant lie, which causes serious harm", regardless of whether or not the person who disseminates false information is a professional journalist. It is reasonably emphasized that "if the function of criminal law is to prevent harm by deterring individuals from engaging in certain forms of conduct, then our laws would be remiss to not make lying subject to criminal sanction in certain egregious cases" (Druzin and Li 2011: 572-573) .
In June of 2017, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine made a significant statement on the need to provide for an adequate legal 1 International principles of professional ethics in journalism provide that "information in journalism is understood as a social good and not as a commodity, which means that journalist shares responsibility for the information transmitted and is thus accountable not only to those controlling the media but ultimately to the public at large, including various social interests" (EthicNet 2008).
treatment for all forms and methods of hybrid war in the Criminal Code of Ukraine. In his opinion, the adequate response to an enemy requires absolute joint actions, the integration of law enforcement and the force of public opinion as a weapon against Russian aggression in the information space (SCU 2017) . There is no doubt that the deliberate dissemination of false information by journalists can be considered one of the manifestations of the hybrid war.
How justified is it to pose the question in such a way?
The current legal approach to the dissemination of deliberately false information by using mass media cannot indeed be considered sufficient;
such actions are capable of causing significant damage to areas of criminal law protection. One argument is that neither disciplinary nor civil liability for the dissemination of false information by a journalist, as opposed to a criminal, can serve as an effective safeguard against serious violations in the area of information relations.
Considering all of the above, the issue of such acts' criminalization is quite interesting as a research perspective.
Any process of criminalization has to be conditioned by certain factors, among which the theory of criminal law names reasons, grounds and conditions of criminalization that should be applied systematically (Dudorov and Khavroniuk 2014: 65-67) .
Having examined the likely range of reasons for criminalizing the dissemination of deliberately false information, one can prove the existence of at least two of them:
• The need to ensure the implementation of legal provisions that regulate the area of information relations (for instance, in Ukraine these are the laws on Information, on the Print Media (Press) in
Ukraine and on Television and Radio) when determining journalists' obligation to disseminate accurate and objective information.
• The dynamics and prevalence of the mentioned act. As experts convincingly argue, spreading false information in Ukraine today is systemic, provided that there is still no effective measure of combating it (Savinova 2014: 100) . Indeed, recent trends demonstrate that the abuse of rights by journalists, their deliberate use of false information that increasingly finds objective proof, has happened quite often. Against such a background, the issue of determining the mental approach of journalists to their own actions seems to be more complicated. Nevertheless, the nature of some information -its obvious and sometimes undeniable falsity -leads to the idea of high probability of intentional conduct.
The only reason for the criminalization of acts is in accordance with the appropriate level and nature of their social danger, which is characterized by the ability to cause significant damage to areas of criminal law protection (Dudorov and Khavroniuk 2014: 66).
With this in mind, dissemination of knowingly false information by a journalist, due to its nature, is first of all able in some cases to harm the interests of the society, the state, the commonwealth and even humanity. We are talking here about the intentional use of inaccurate data in mass media. Such actions can be committed in order to create a controlled impact on a particular group of people or humanity in general with a goal of inciting enmity and hatred, artificially creating a conflict situation or its escalation, and so on. As aptly noted by Ganna Yudkivska, a judge in the European Court of Human Rights, "false speech" can be no less dangerous than the classic "hate speech". The falsification of facts, even without explicit calls for violence, easily creates an atmosphere of hatred. The question of how modern mechanisms of human rights protection provide an adequate response to these challenges remains unanswered. Obviously, under the circumstances of today's media space, fake information is disseminated very easily (Yudkivska 2016) and therefore "open societies remain surprisingly susceptible to misinformation that instigates intimidation, discrimination and violence against vulnerable groups. Untruths doled out in hate campaigns find ready buyers even in a free marketplace of ideas" (Cherian 2016 ).
Modern Ukrainian practice covers some cases when a journalist uses inaccurate information, which ultimately leads to the breakdown of mobilization, disturbance of public order, spread of panic, loss of government or public institution authority, loss of business reputation and so on. However, journalistic crimes do not recognize borders and become international, thus creating a global problem. According to Victoriya Romanyuk, deputy chief editor of the StopFake project, 2 the methods used in Russian propaganda are universal and can be employed against any opponent and any country. In 2015, the developers of this project analysed numerous obviously false reports in the context of the conflicts in Syria and Turkey, which allowed them to openly comment on the trends and universal approaches of the Russian propaganda machine (GU 2016). In Germany, the criminal case of Lisa F. attracted high publicity.
On 16 January 2016, the Russian First Channel featured a story about a 13-year-old Russian-speaking resident of Berlin, Lisa, who had been allegedly kidnapped and raped by three men appearing to be migrants from the Middle East. The Berlin prosecutor's office, after conducting an investigation, concluded that the girl had never been raped or abducted.
After that, a criminal case was filed against a journalist of the First Channel, Ivan Blagoy, who filmed a fake report on the "raped" 13-year-old Russianspeaking girl. Later, the criminal case against the journalist was closed due to a lack of evidence that Ivan Blagoy was aware that information about the commission of the crime was not true (DW 2016).
As for One of the most dangerous facts is that the journalistic environment in
Ukraine particularly has been influenced by the Russian special service.
2 This project has been created by professional journalists in order to counter the information war in Ukraine and is aimed at exposing outright false information about Ukraine, which is disseminated in the media. Nowadays «StopFake» has gone beyond an investigative journalism project and has turned into an international analytical platform which specializes in studying and recording instances of media influence and also remains an important center of media education in Ukraine.
According to Roman Zaitsev, the executive director of Mirotvorets, the centre for the study of crimes against the national security of Ukraine, human security and international order, some Ukrainian media are used as instruments of propaganda in the hands of the enemy. They work directly or indirectly for the enemy, thus influencing the minds of Ukrainian citizens. However, he notes that the Ukrainian audience possesses much stronger immunity compared with the Russian (Faktyi 2016) .
The discussed actions are also characterized by the creation of a real threat of causing substantial harm to public relations with regard to public order, public security, the authority of government agencies, the peace and security of humanity, and so on. We should not forget that the public According to experts on journalism ethics, a journalist must be sure of the veracity of the information he disseminates and be sure of the information source's trustworthiness. Journalists must be particularly vigilant in order not to harm anybody by unveiling incomplete or inaccurate information. Wilful distortion of facts, their biased selection, disseminating false information or obtaining material incentives from third parties for a biased publication constitute a gross violation of ethical standards (Ivanov and Serdiuk 2007: 135; Prystupenko 2008: 228-229; Vymětal et al. 2008) .
As for the conditions of criminal law and the criminal procedural nature, then, first of all, the criminalization of dissemination by a journalist of deliberately false information has some ability to complicate the process of criminal law analyses in the area of establishing intentional fault as an essential element of the crime's mens rea and separating, based on this element, the instances of negligent dissemination of false information by a journalist. Secondly, the emergence of difficulties in proving the fact of committing such violation is quite possible, including proof of wilfulness when committing relevant acts. A striking example of this is the aforementioned criminal case of Lisa F., in which law enforcement agencies in Germany failed to prove the intention of disseminating inaccurate information by the journalist (unfortunately, the impossibility of proving this does not exclude the fact that the journalist could actually perceive the complete untrustworthiness of the disseminated information).
One of the perceived drawbacks of criminalization of the dissemination of knowingly false information by a journalist should be recognized as a currently existing threat of abuse by law enforcement agencies and by court of their positions when employing the discussed criminal law provision to pressure journalists, attack freedom of speech, and so on.
Thus, all necessary grounds for criminalizing the dissemination of knowingly false information by journalists are present, but not all preconditions.
Accordingly, such a criminalization, in case of its potential implementation, may become very risky. The mentioned risks are perceived, and I am not, therefore, a supporter of implementing this scenario. At the same time, this does not mean that counteracting journalists' activities mentioned in this article is worthless. Obviously, this should be done in a way that does not involve a repressive character, which is inherent in criminal law.
Institutes of civil society, and the journalistic environment itself that has to demonstrate intolerance of malicious media practices, recognize and cover them, come to the foreground here. As for Ukraine, which remains in a state of hybrid war, it is equally important to formulate the appropriate information policy strategy at the state level, which would include a set of measures to detect fake news and its timely denial. In particular, the 
Conclusion
Modern manifestations of hybrid war serve as a powerful challenge for the countries that face them. One of the key features of hybridity is increasingly becoming the influence of negative information based on the implementation of mass media, the internet (including social networks) and other advanced computer technologies to achieve military and political objectives. The advantage of an informational and psychological impact on minds is becoming a prerequisite for the successful implementation of military goals, as has been convincingly proved by the current experience of Ukraine.
One way of influencing negative information under the conditions of hybrid warfare is providing knowingly false information to the object of influence with the purpose of its disorientation. In Ukraine, such a method has gained wide application and was used long before the active phase pretend that the phenomenon does not exist would seem a big mistake.
This article raises the question of isolating a separate category of criminality, which it is proposed be called offences in the area of professional journalistic activities. Such a type of criminality should be considered a system of criminal acts where a journalist can be either a victim or an offender.
It has been proved that offences in the area of professional journalistic activities constitute a combination of intentional acts committed by and against a journalist and are also related to his activities surrounding the collection, receipt, creation, dissemination, storage or other use of information. As a potential crime perpetrator, a journalist may be held criminally liable for the commission in the course of his professional activities of crimes related to: a) violation of the rules for collecting, 
